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INTRODUCTION
Despite having received sustained attention from both policymakers
and academic commentators for the past several years, network neutrality
shows no signs of retreating from the forefront of the policy debate. It
has remained a central focus for Congress,1 the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC),2 and both presidential candidates during the last
election.3 As President, Barack Obama has effectively ensured that
network neutrality will remain at the top of the policy agenda by
including provisions in the stimulus package requiring that the FCC
* Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director, Center for
Technology, Innovation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania. The author thanks the
Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for its financial support.
1. See The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5353 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong.
(2008); Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet: Hearing Before the Task Force on
Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008).
2. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13,028 (2008); En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices Before the
FCC (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/mt022508v.ram.
3. See Lee Gomes, Debugging Obama-McCain, FORBES, Oct. 13, 2008, at 72.
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formulate a national broadband plan and through requiring that grants
made by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration comply with the network neutrality principles articulated
by the FCC in 2005.4
Although pinning down a precise definition of network neutrality
has proven elusive,5 the most common position appears to be that
network providers should route traffic without regard to the source or
content of the packets, the application with which the packets are
associated, or the sender’s willingness to pay. In the words of leading
network neutrality proponent Lawrence Lessig, “Net neutrality means
simply that all like Internet content must be treated alike and move at
the same speed over the network.”6
Some commentators have questioned whether this description of
network neutrality represents an accurate description of the Internet’s
past.7 Indeed, it would be surprising if any two similar packets would be
treated exactly alike when traveling through a network consisting of more
than thirty thousand autonomous systems that each determine their
terms of interconnection through arms-length negotiations. There are,
however, some systematic changes in the architecture of the Internet that
have largely been overlooked by both commentators and policymakers.
These changes are largely the result of network providers’ attempts to
reduce cost, manage congestion, and maintain quality of service.
4. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(j)–
(k), 123 Stat. 115, 515–16.
5. See Rachelle B. Chong, The 31 Flavors of Net Neutrality: A Policymaker’s View, 12
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 147, 151–55 (2008) (identifying five distinct versions of network
neutrality); Eli Noam, A Third Way for Net Neutrality, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/acf14410-3776-11db-bc01-0000779e2340.html (identifying seven
distinct versions of network neutrality).
6. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2006, at A23.
7. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Portioning Bit by Bit: The Myth of
Network Neutrality and the Threat to Internet Innovation, MILKEN INST. REV., 1st Qtr. 2007,
at 28, 31–33; Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An
Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
19, 36–37 (2009); Douglas A. Hass, Comment, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed
End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1576–77
(2007); Kai Zhu, Note, Bringing Neutrality to Network Neutrality, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
615, 634–36 (2007); Michael Grebb, Neutral Net? Who Are You Kidding?, WIRED, May 31,
2006, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/internet/0,71012-0.html; ANDREA RENDA, I
OWN THE PIPE, YOU CALL THE TUNE: THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND ITS
(IR)RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE 9-11 (2008), available at http://shop.ceps.eu/
downfree.php?item_id=1755; Craig McTaggart, Was the Internet Ever Neutral?, 34 RES.
CONF. ON COMM’N, INFO. & INTERNET POL’Y 1, 4–14 (2006), available at
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggart-tprc06rev.pdf; David Clark, Written
Statement to the En Banc Public Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices
(Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network_management/
022508/clark.pdf (“The Internet is not neutral and has not been for a long time.”).
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Part I frames the subsequent developments by describing the
architecture and business relationships that defined the early Internet.
Part II analyzes the architectural changes that have made the Internet’s
topology increasingly heterogeneous, including the emergence of
multihoming, secondary peering, private networks, and content delivery
networks. Part III describes the changes in ways that networks
interconnect and price their services, focusing on the emergence of peerto-peer applications and pricing innovations that go beyond the
traditional bipartite distinction between peering and transit. Far from
representing some network provider’s efforts to promote its self interest
at the expense of the public, as some network neutrality proponents have
suggested, these changes have the potential to yield substantial benefits
both to individual consumers and to society as a whole.
I.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE EARLY INTERNET

This Part reviews the architecture of the early Internet. Section A
reviews the tripartite hierarchical structure that characterized its
topology. Section B describes the peering and transit relationships that
governed the way individual networks interconnected with one another.
A.

The Topology of the Early Internet

When the Internet first emerged, its topology and the business
relationships comprising it were relatively simple. As is widely known,
the Internet evolved out of the NSFNET backbone, which was created
in 1986 and eventually decommissioned in 1997 to provide universities
all over the country access to federally funded supercomputing centers
located in five universities. The primary architects of the NSFNET
decided to give it a tripartite structure. At the top was the NSFNET
backbone, which at its peak connected sixteen research facilities across
the country. At the bottom were the campus networks run by individual
universities. In the middle were regional networks (typically operated by
university consortia or state-university partnerships) that linked the
campus networks to the major computing centers.8

8. MERIT NETWORK, INC., NSFNET: A PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGH-SPEED
NETWORKING, FINAL REPORT 1987–1995, at 11–12 (1996), available at
http://www.merit.edu/documents/pdf/nsfnet/nsfnet_report.pdf;
Juan
D.
Rogers,
Internetworking and the Politics of Science: NSFNET in Internet History, 14 INFO. SOC’Y 213,
219 (1998).

J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.

82

[Vol. 8

Figure 1: The NSFNET Backbone circa 1992-1993
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Every packet had to travel through a parallel path traversing each
level of the hierarchy. For example, traffic originating on one campus
network would have to connect to the regional network with which it
was associated, which handed off the traffic to the NSFNET backbone,
which in turn handed it off to the regional network that served the
destination campus network. The result was to create a series of parallel
hierarchies through which all traffic had to traverse.
The network retained this same basic architecture when it was
privatized during the mid-1990s. The NSFNET backbone at the top of
the hierarchy was replaced by a series of private backbone providers that
interconnected with one another at four public network access points
(NAPs) established by the NSF. The campus networks at the bottom of
the hierarchy were replaced by last-mile providers that transported traffic
from local distribution facilities maintained in individual cities (which in
the case of digital subscriber lines (DSL) is usually called a central office
and in the case of cable modem systems is usually called a headend) to
end users’ residences and places of business. The regional networks
evolved into regional Internet service providers (ISPs) that transported
traffic between the NAPs served by backbone providers and the central
offices and headends maintained by last-mile providers.
The privatization of the Internet did not change the hierarchical
nature of the basic architecture. Each regional ISP still connected to a
single backbone, and each last-mile provider still connected to a single
regional ISP. Indeed, the early versions of the protocol employed by the
backbones (known as border gateway protocol or BGP) would not
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Figure 2: The NSF
FNET Three-Tiered Network Architecture

support more complex ttopologies.9
The one-to-one rrelationship conferred a number of advantages.
This architecture constiituted a “spanning tree” that connected all of the
nodes with the minimuum number of links.10 Furthermore, the fact that
the path between an
ny two nodes was unique greatly simplified
determining the path aalong which traffic should be routed. That said,
tree architectures are also subject to a number of drawbacks. The
uniqueness of the path connecting any two nodes means that the failure
of any link or node in tthe network will inevitably disconnect part of the
network. Even when alll network elements are operating properly, if the
rate at which traffic arrrives exceeds any particular element’s capacity to
route the traffic, that n
network element will become congested and the
quality of service provid
ded will deteriorate.11 In addition, the hierarchical
structure made each neetwork participant completely dependent on the
players operating at th
he level above them, which in turn provided
backbones with a potential source of market power.12

9. Christopher S. Yoo, N
Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J.
1847, 1860–61 (2006) [hereinaafter Yoo, Economics of Congestion]; Christopher S. Yoo, Network
Neutrality, Consumers, and IInnovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 179, 195–96 (2008)
[hereinafter Yoo, Consumers an
nd Innovation].
10. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex
Systems: A Graph Theory Approaach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1696 (2005).
11. Id. at 1699–700.
12. See Stanley Besen eet al., Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering
Agreements, 91 AM. ECON. RE
EV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 292 (2001).
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Business Relationships on the Early Internet: Peering and Transit

The early Internet was also characterized by relatively simple
business relationships. End users typically purchased Internet access
through some form of all-you-can-eat pricing, which allowed them to
consume as much bandwidth as they would like for a single flat rate.
Relationships between network providers typically fell into two
categories. Tier-1 ISPs entered into peering relationships with one
another, in which they exchanged traffic on a settlement-free basis and
no money changed hands. The primary justification for foregoing
payment is transaction costs. Although the backbones could meter and
bill each other for the traffic they exchanged, they could avoid the cost of
doing so without suffering any economic harm so long as the traffic they
exchanged was roughly symmetrical. Such arrangements would not be
economical with when the traffic being exchanged by the two networks
was severely imbalanced. Thus tier-1 ISPs will not peer with other
networks that are unable to maintain a minimum level of traffic volume.
In addition, peering partners typically require that inbound and
outbound traffic not exceed a certain ratio. Networks that cannot meet
these requirements must enter into transit arrangements in which they
pay the backbone to provide connectivity to the rest of the Internet.13
Most early analyses focused on the financial terms of these
arrangements.14 What is often overlooked is that interconnection
agreements performed two distinct functions. Network providers enter
into interconnection agreements not only to send and receive traffic.
They also enter into interconnection agreements to announce to the rest
of the Internet where the IP addresses that they control are located.
Consider this from the perspective of a small network, A, which
serves a small number of its own customers and purchases access to the
rest of the Internet through another ISP. The transit agreement between
A and the ISP would not only require the ISP to receive traffic sent by A
and to deliver traffic bound to A. It would also require the ISP to
announce to the rest of the Internet how to reach the IP prefixes
associated with A’s customers. In addition, A can maintain a very simple
routing table. It need only keep track of the prefixes of the customers
that it serves. For all other IP addresses, A can enter a “default route” into
its routing table that directs all other traffic to the other ISP.

13. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 9, at 1877; Michael Kende, The Digital
Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 5 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper
No. 32, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf;
Peyman Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection, 72 COMMC’NS &
STRATEGIES 51, 55–56 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Kende, supra note 13, at 5.
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Figure 3: T
The Architecture of the Early Internet

The existence off default routes creates a potential problem,
however. If none of th
he routing tables involved in a particular routing
session contained the loocation of the destination, by default the networks
would simply hand thee packets back and forth, and the packets would
never reach their final d
destination. The only way to avoid these problems
is for one or more netw
work providers to maintain routing tables that map
the entire Internet with
hout employing any default routes. Thus, tier-1
ISPs are defined not on
nly by the fact that they engage in settlement-free
peering with one another, but also by the fact that they maintain routing
defaults.15 Peering contracts also include a number
tables that contain no d
of other requirements to guard against free riding and to ensure the
proper functioning of th
he network.16
II.

THE EVOLUTION
N OF THE INTERNET’S TOPOLOGY

Over the past deecade, ISPs have begun to enter into a more
complex set of intercoonnection arrangements that violate the strict
tripartite hierarchy thaat characterized the early Internet. In addition,
content providers have begun to experiment with a variety of ways to
locate their content closer to end users. Both types of changes have
15. Paul Milgrom et al., C
Competitive Effects of Internet Peering Policies, in THE INTERNET
UPHEAVAL 175, 179–80 (Ingoo Vogelsang & Benjamin M. Compaine eds., 2000).
16. Faratin et al., supra noote 13, at 54.
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significant policy implications that have largely been overlooked in the
policy debate.
A.

Private Peering, Multihoming, and Secondary Peering

One of the first problems to emerge in the early Internet was
congestion in the NAPs, which often caused throughput times and
network reliability to degrade. Some estimate that congestion in the
NAPs caused packet loss at times to run as high as 40%.17 As the NAPs
became increasingly congested, backbones began to find it advantageous
to exchange traffic at private interconnection points.18
In addition, regional ISPs have begun to connect to more than one
backbone, a practice known as multihoming, in part to protect against
service outages and in part to limit their vulnerability to any exertion of
market power by a backbone.19 Regional ISPs that did not have sufficient
volume to peer with the tier-1 backbones also began to find that they did
have sufficient volume to peer with other regional ISPs, a practice known
as secondary peering. Enabling regional ISPs to exchange traffic on a
settlement-free basis reduced the costs borne by end users. In addition
secondary peering would often shorten the number of hops needed for
particular packets to reach their final destination and make them subject
to bilateral (as opposed to multiparty) negotiations, both of which should
increase networks’ control over quality of service.20 Secondary peering
and multihoming also made the network more robust by creating
multiple paths through which network nodes could interconnect. In fact,
as much as seventy percent of the nodes in the Internet can now
communicate with one another without passing through the public
backbone.21 This had the additional benefit of weakening the market
position of the top-tier backbones, since any breakdown in the business
relationship would not necessarily disconnect the ISP from the network
and the ability to route along different paths places a natural limit on the
backbones’ ability to engage in supracompetitive pricing.22
17. See InterNAP Wakes Up Transmission Quality, RED HERRING, Apr. 21, 1999,
http://redherring.com/Home/1744; see also Kende, supra note 13, at 6 (citing reports that
packet loss in the NAP located in Washington, D.C., ran as high as 20%).
18. Kende, supra note 13, at 6–7; Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 62.
19. See Nicholas Economides, “Net Neutrality,” Non-Discrimination, and Digital
Distribution of Content Through the Internet, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 209, 220
(2008).
20. See OECD, WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION
SERVICES POLICIES, INTERNET TRAFFIC EXCHANGE: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND
MEASUREMENT OF GROWTH
21–22
(2006),
http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/
Publication.3081.html; Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 55–56.
21. See Shai Carmi et al., A Model of Internet Topology Using k-Shell Decomposition, 104
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,150, 11,151 (2007).
22. See Besen et al., supra note 12, at 294–95.
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Figure 4: The Emerggence of Multihoming and Secondary Peering

The emergence off interconnection relationships that deviate from
the strict hierarchy that characterized the early Internet represents a
substantial deviation froom network neutrality. For example, assume that
an end user is dow
wnloading content from both CNN.com and
MSNBC.com. Assumee further that the end user’s regional ISP has a
secondary peering relatiionship with the regional ISP serving CNN.com,
but does not have a secoondary peering relationship with the regional ISP
serving MSNBC.com. The absence of a secondary peering relationship
means that traffic from
m MSNBC.com will have to pay transit charges,
while traffic from CNN
N.com will not. The result is that traffic that is
functionally identical will end up paying different amounts. The
differences in topologyy may also allow the traffic from CNN.com to
maintain greater control over the quality of service.
The presence of multiple routes between these two points also
complicates routing deccisions. The presence of multiple paths connecting
two points naturally meeans that someone must decide along which path
to route the traffic. Although most networks choose routes that
minimize the number oof hops, networks may sometimes find it beneficial
to route traffic in oorder to satisfy other requirements of their
interconnection relationships. For example, a network may seek to
enhance efficiency by balancing the loads between the two links.
Multihomed entities caan also monitor the quality of service provided by
each connection and rooute the most delay-sensitive traffic along the link
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with the lowest latency.23
In addition, transit contracts call for customers to pay a flat fee up
to a predetermined peak volume (known as the committed rate) and pay
additional charges for any volume that exceeds that level. For the same
reason that consumers with two mobile telephones have the incentive to
use up all of the prepaid minutes on both lines before incurring any
additional per-minute charges, multihomed entities have the incentive to
utilize all of their committed rate before paying additional fees. This
lowers overall transit cost, but requires diverting some traffic along a path
that is longer than the one stored in the routing tables.24 For similar
reasons, a network may intentionally route traffic over a more costly path
if doing so will help it maintain its traffic within the ratios mandated by
its peering contract.25 Again, the effect is to introduce significant
variance in the speed with which similarly situated packets will arrive at
their destination and the cost that similarly situated packets will have to
bear. This variance results not from anticompetitive motives, but rather
from networks’ attempts to minimize costs and ensure quality of service
in the face of a network topology that is increasingly heterogeneous.
B.

Server Farms and Content Delivery Networks

Large content providers have begun to employ other means to
reduce cost and manage latency. One solution is to forego maintaining a
single large server and instead to deploy multiple points of presence in
carrier hotels across the country. Doing so allows these content providers
to avoid paying transit charges to reach the public backbone and instead
transmit their traffic through secondary peering arraignments with tier-2
ISPs. Greater reliance on private networks also gives the content
providers greater control over network security and performance.26
Indeed, a recent study indicates that Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft have
been able to use server farms to bypass the backbone altogether for
roughly a third of their traffic and to keep their number of hops for
traffic that had to pass through the backbone to no more than one or

23. Fanglu Guo et al., Experiences in Building a Multihoming Load Balancing System,
IEEE INFOCOM CONF., 2004, available at http://www.ieee-infocom.org/2004/Papers/
26_4.PDF.
24. INTERNAP NETWORK SERVS. CORP., ECONOMICS OF MULTI-HOMING AND
PREMISE-BASED OPTIMIZATION 10 (2008), available at http://internap.com/pdf/whitepapers/WP_FCP_Economics_of_MultiHoming_0208.pdf.
25. Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 64–65.
26. See Stephanie N. Mehta, Behold the Server Farm! Glorious Temple of the Information
Age!, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune_archive/2006/08/07/8382587/index.htm; R. Scott Raynovich, Google’s Own Private
Internet,
LIGHT
READING,
Sept.
20,
2005,
http://www.lightreading.com/
document.asp?doc_id=80968.
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Figure 5: Cach
hing and Content Delivery Networks

two.27
ns, content providers are distributing their data
On other occasion
through content delivvery networks (CDNs) such as Akamai and
Limelight. CDNs in
n effect substitute storage for long-distance
networking capacity by maintaining a network of local caches across the
Internet. When an end
d user sends a request for a webpage hosted by a
CDN, that query is red
directed to the cache. CDNs are thus able to use
storage to serve multip
ple queries for the same content without using
significant network resoources. The geographic dispersion of the caches
usually dictates that thee file will be served by a location closer than would
be possible if all of thee content were stored in a central server, which
minimizes cost and lattency. The distributed nature of the caches also
provides protection agaiinst denial of service attacks and allows the CDN
to redirect queries to other caches when particular caches are overly
congested.28
CDNs represent an innovative way to deal with the increasing
complexity of the Inteernet. The problem is that they are nonneutral.
CDNs work best for staatic content; they are less well suited to interactive
content that changes dynamically. More to the point, CDNs are
hus greater reliability and quality of service are
commercial services; th
available only to those w
who are willing to pay for them.29
To the extent thaat CDNs use the public backbone to deliver the
27. See Phillippa Gill et aal., The Flattening Internet Topology: Natural Evolution, Unsightly
Barnacles or Contrived Collapsse?, PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MEASUREMENT CONF. (2008),
available at http://www.hpl.hpp.com/techreports/2008/HPL-2008-47.pdf.
28. Yoo, Economics of Con
ngestion, supra note 9, at 1872; Yoo, Consumers and Innovation,
supra note 9, at 199, 214–15.
29. Yoo, Economics of Con
ngestion, supra note 9, at 1882–83.
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content to their caches, they are best regarded as an overlay to the
existing network. Increasingly, however, CDNs and server farms are
bypassing the public backbone altogether and connecting to their caches
through private networks, in the process transforming CDNs into a
fundamentally different architecture.30
All of these developments represent innovative solutions to adjust to
the realities of the Internet. The differences in topology means that
traffic that is otherwise similar may travel through the network at
different speeds, with different costs, and with different levels of quality
of service.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
The evolution of the Internet has not been restricted to topology.
Network participants have also been experimenting with an increasingly
broad range of business arrangements. As I discuss in Section A, some of
these innovations have been driven by the increasing significance of peerto-peer technologies. Section B discusses the emergence of alternative
business arrangements known as partial transit and paid peering.
A.

The Growing Importance of Peer-to-Peer Architectures

One of the primary forces causing business relationships to change
is the growing importance of applications using peer-to-peer
technologies. The traditional Internet employed what is known as a
client-server architecture, in which files are stored in large computers at
centralized locations (servers) and end users (clients) request files from
those computers. The relationship is generally regarded as hierarchical.
In addition, the amount of data uploaded by clients is very small relative
to the amount of data downloaded by servers. In the classic example of
the World Wide Web, client traffic consists solely of uniform resource
locators (URLs), the short bits of code identifying a particular website
address. Server traffic, which consists of the data comprising the
requested website, is much larger. For this reason, the technologies that
took the early lead in broadband deployment (cable modem service and
DSL) adapted an asymmetric architecture, allocating a larger proportion
of the available bandwidth to downloading than to uploading. Newer
technologies, such as fiber and wireless broadband, follow the same
pattern.31
Peer-to-peer technologies follow a very different approach. Edge
computers in a peer-to-peer architecture are not divided into those that
30. See Dave Clark et al., Overlay Networks and the Future of the Internet, 63 COMMC’NS
& STRATEGIES 109, 123–25 (2006).
31. Yoo, Consumers and Innovation, supra note 9, at 191.

2010]

INNOVATIONS THAT CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO

91

host files and those that request files. Instead, computers simultaneously
perform both functions. Because this relationship is regarded as less
hierarchical than client-server relationships, the computers in this
architecture are known as peers and communications between them are
known as peer-to-peer. Peer-to-peer is thus not synonymous with file
sharing or user-generated content, as is often mistakenly assumed. On
the contrary, many peer-to-peer applications (such as Vuze) support
commercial broadcast services, and many platforms for user-generated
content (such as YouTube) employ centralized servers. The real
significance of the term peer-to-peer lies in the nature of the network
architecture.
It is not yet clear what proportion of network traffic will follow each
architecture. For example, peer-to-peer traffic had consistently
outstripped client-server traffic for several years leading up to 2007. In
2007, however, client-server traffic staged a comeback, thanks primarily
to the expansion of streaming video services like YouTube, and exceeded
peer-to-peer traffic 45% to 37%.32 Many industry observers now predict
that although peer-to-peer will remain important, it will decline as a
percentage of total Internet traffic over the next several years.33 Even so,
it is clear that peer-to-peer traffic is likely to remain a more important
component of network traffic than it was during the Internet’s early
years.
The growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies is causing
significant congestion in certain areas of the network and is putting
pressure on the traditional approach to pricing network services. The
emergence of end users as important sources of data is putting severe
pressure on the limited bandwidth allocated to upload traffic. In
addition, unlike in a client-server architecture, where end users usually
only generate traffic when a person is seated at the keyboard, edge
computers in a peer-to-peer architecture can generate traffic for as long
as the computer is left running. The result is that the lion’s share of
upload traffic is generated by a small number of superheavy peer-to-peer
users. As few as five percent of end users may be responsible for
generating more than 50 percent of all Internet traffic.34
32. See Press Release, Ellacoya Networks, Inc, Ellacoya Data Shows Web Traffic
Overtakes Peer-to-Peer (P2P) as Largest Percentage of Bandwidth on the Network (June 18,
2007), (on file with the author), available at http://www.ellacoya.com/news/pdf/2007/
NXTcommEllacoyamediaalert.pdf.
33. CISCO SYS., INC., CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND
METHODOLOGY 2008–2013, at 1–2, 5–6 (June 9, 2009), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/
solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-481360.pdf.
34. See Steven Levy, Pay per Gig, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at D1; DAVID VORHAUS,
YANKEE GROUP, CONFRONTING THE ALBATROSS OF P2P 1 (May 31, 2007); Comments
of CTIA – The Wireless Association, in the Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network
Management Practices by Broadband Network Operators, WC Docket No 07-52, 12 (Feb. 13,
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Figure 6: The T
Traditional Approach to Internet Pricing

The most recentt generation of peer-to-peer technologies can
exacerbate congestion sttill further. In the first generation of peer-to-peer
technologies, each end user stored the entirety of the files they hosted.
As a result, anyone rrequesting those files was limited by the total
bandwidth and the levvel of congestion associated with the network
connection attached to that end user’s computer. Technologies such as
BitTorrent follow a diffferent approach. Instead of storing entire files in
one location, BitTorreent divides each file into pieces and distributes
them at multiple locatioons around the Internet. When a BitTorrent user
requests a file, the sooftware then retrieves the various pieces from
multiple computers aat the same time. Reducing the amount of
bandwidth required from
m any one peer improves download performance.
BitTorrent also dynamiically reallocates requests for pieces away from the
slowest connections and
d toward the fastest connections, thereby placing
the heaviest burden on tthose peers with the fastest connections.
The congestion cauused by peer-to-peer technologies weighs heaviest
on last-mile technologiies that share bandwidth locally, such as cablemodem and wireless bbroadband systems. For example, cable modem
technology requires th
hat subscribers share bandwidth with the other
households operating th
hrough the same neighborhood node. As a result,
cable modem custom
mers are significantly more vulnerable to the
downloading habits of their immediate neighbors than are telephonebased broadband systeems, which offer dedicated local connections.

2008),
http://gullfoss2.ffcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=
6519841180.
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Service can slow to a crawl if as few as fifteen of the five hundred or so
users sharing the same node are using peer-to-peer applications to
download files.35
The classic economic solution to congestion is to set the price of
incremental network usage equal to the congestion costs imposed on the
network by that usage. However, determining the congestion cost
imposed by any particular user at any particular time can be quite
complex. Subscribers that use large amounts of bandwidth can contribute
very little to network congestion if they confine their usage to hours
when network usage is low. Conversely, a subscriber that only uses small
amounts of bandwidth may nonetheless impose significant congestion
costs on the network if they generate traffic at peak times. The
contribution of any particular usage cannot be determined simply by
counting the number of bits being transmitted. The overall impact of any
particular increase in network usage can only be determined in light of
other subscribers’ Internet usage.36 Thus it may make sense to charge
different amounts to users who are using the Internet to access the same
content or application if a sufficient number of other users sharing the
same bandwidth are using the network at the same time.
The growth of peer-to-peer technologies has also heightened the
pressure on the models that network providers have used to price their
services. As noted earlier, the traditional approach charges content and
application providers prices that increase with the peak bandwidth
consumed, while end users are charged on an unmetered, all-you-can-eat
basis. The fact that every download had to pass through one link that
charged on a volume-sensitive basis allowed this pricing approach to
serve as a reasonable approximation of efficient congestion pricing. For
example, one hundred downloads of a 700 megabyte movie would
generate 70 gigabytes of traffic from the server, which in turn would be
reflected in the price paid by the content provider to its ISP.
The situation is quite different under peer-to-peer architecture. In
that case, the movie could be downloaded once from the server, and the
remaining ninety-nine downloads could be served by other end users
running the same peer-to-peer software. Because end users are provided
with service on an all-you-can-eat basis, the additional ninety-nine
downloads served by the peer-to-peer network do not generate any
additional revenue. The only revenue received by the network is for the

35. See James J. Martin & James M. Westall, Assessing the Impact of BitTorrent on
DOCSIS Networks, IEEE BROADNETS, Sept. 2007, available at http://people.clemson.edu/
~jmarty/papers/bittorrentBroadnets.pdf; see also Leslie Ellis, BitTorrent’s Swarms Have a
Deadly Bite on Broadband Nets, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 8, 2006,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6332098.html.
36. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 9, at 1868–69.
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initial 700 megabyte download. Thus, in a peer-to-peer architecture, the
amounts that content providers pay under the traditional pricing regime
no longer serve as a workable approximation of the total traffic they
impose on the network. Moreover, the failure to charge network
participants prices that reflect their incremental contribution to
congestion causes excessive consumption of network resources that
ultimately harms consumers.
It thus comes as no surprise that the network providers that are
most subject to local congestion are experimenting with other means for
managing the congestion caused by peer-to-peer applications. For
example, Time Warner has recently experimented with bandwidth caps
and other forms of metered pricing. Although many network neutrality
proponents have no objection to metered pricing,37 recent attempts to
impose metered pricing and bandwidth caps have met such a hostile
reaction from the network neutrality community that the network
providers had to back down.38 That said, metered pricing is far from a
panacea. As I have discussed in greater detail, true congestion-based
pricing would vary from moment to moment based on the volume of
traffic introduced into the network by other users. Not only would such a
pricing regime challenge consumers’ ability to process the relevant
information; the distributed nature of the Internet means that no one
entity has the information needed to formulate such policies. As a result,
other network providers have turned to proxies that are strongly
associated with high-volume activity, which most importantly includes a
ban on operating a server as required by peer-to-peer technologies.39
37. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 109th Cong 55, 58, 74 (2006) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig), available
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg605/pdf/CHRG-109shrg605.pdf; Tim
Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
141, 154 (2003).
38. For criticism of Time Warner’s January 2008 attempt to impose metered pricing, see
Catherine Holahan, Time Warner’s Pricing Paradox: Proposed Changes in the Cable Provider’s
Fees for Web Could Crimp Demand for Download Services and Hurt Net Innovation, BUS. WK.,
Jan.
18,
2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2008/
tc20080118_598544.htm; Posting of Marvin Ammori to Save the Internet, Time Warner
Goes Back to the Future, http://www.savetheinternet.com/archive/2008/01/25/back-to-thefuture-time-warner-broadband-plan-recalls-aols-walled-garden/ (Jan. 25, 2008); Posting of
Lynn Erskine to Save the Internet, Time Warner Metered Pricing: Not the Solution,
http://www.savetheinternet.com/blog/2008/01/17/time-warner%e2%80%99s-meteredpricing-not-the-solution/ (Jan. 17, 2008); Posting of Fred von Lohmann to DeepLinks, Time
Warner Puts a Meter on the Internet, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/01/time-warnersputs-meter-internet (Jan. 22, 2008). For criticism of Time Warner’s January 2009 attempt to
impose bandwidth caps, see Press Release, Free Press, Free Press Wary of Internet Caps (Feb.
4, 2009), http://www.freepress.net/node/47855; Press Release, Public Knowledge, Public
Knowledge Statement on Time Warner Halt to Broadband Caps (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2100.
39. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 9, at 1871.
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Although this would constitute a violation of network neutrality by
discriminating against a particular type of application, even network
neutrality proponents acknowledge that such a restriction represents a
good proxy for bandwidth-intensive activity.40
B.

The Emergence of Partial Transit and Paid Peering

Network providers have also begun to enter into business
relationships that go beyond peering and transit relationships that
dominated the early Internet. Some are driven by the emergence of
secondary peering relationships discussed above.41 Before such
relationships existed, a tier-2 or tier-3 ISP would have to buy transit
from a tier-1 ISP that had obtained access to all of the IP addresses that
it did not serve. In other words, a tier-2 or tier-3 ISP’s transit
relationships would cover the entire Internet (except for its own
customers).
The advent of secondary peering reduces the scope of transit
services that the ISP needs to purchase. In short, the ISP no longer needs
to buy transit to the entire Internet. The secondary peering relationships
already provide it with the ability to reach those customers served by its
secondary peering partners. As a result, these ISPs have begun to
purchase partial transit that covers less than the entire Internet (i.e.,
those portions of the Internet not already covered by its secondary
peering relationships). In addition, an ISP with inbound traffic that far
exceeds its outbound traffic may run the risk of having traffic ratios that
put it in violation of its peering contract. Under these circumstances, it
may attempt to cover its deficit in outbound traffic by selling partial
transit contract that covers only outbound traffic, but not inbound traffic.
Alternatively, it may reduce its inbound traffic by buying partial transit
for inbound traffic.42
Another interesting development is the emergence of paid peering.43
Paid peering involves all of the same aspects as conventional peering
relationships. Peers announce to the rest of the Internet the addresses
that their peering partners control, maintain a sufficient number of
interconnection points across the country, and maintain the requisite
total volume and traffic ratios. The key difference is that one peering
40. Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics
of the Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 409 (2007).
41. See supra Part II.A.
42. Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 60–61.
43. For earlier discussions, see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality after Comcast:
Toward a Case-by-Case Approach to Reasonable Network Management, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY: THE WAY FORWARD 55, 71–76 (Randolph J. May
ed., 2009) [hereinafter Yoo, Toward a Case-by-Case Approach]; Yoo, Consumers and Innovation,
supra note 9, at 222–27.
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Figure 7: Paid Peering and the Economics of Two-Sided Markets
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partner pays the other partner for its services.
Paid peering is driven by both supply-side and demand-side
considerations. Starting first with the supply side, settlement-free peering
arrangements between tier-1 ISPs with similar traffic volumes make
sense only if both networks have similar costs. Over time, backbones
have begun to serve two different types of last-mile networks: those that
primarily serve content and application providers (such as Cogent and
Abovenet), which some commentators call “content networks,” and those
that serve end users (such as Comcast and Verizon), which some
commentators call “eyeball networks.”44 The costs of the first type of
network (connecting content and application providers) are quite low,
typically only requiring a single high-speed line to a small number of
business locations. The costs of the second type of network (connecting
end users) are considerably higher, requiring the wiring and upgrading of
equipment in entire neighborhoods. The presence of such asymmetric
costs provides a substantial impetus for cash to flow from networks
serving content and application providers to networks providing
connections to end users.45
These supply-side considerations are reinforced by demand-side
considerations associated with the economics of two-sided markets,
which illustrates the potential benefits of allowing network providers to
charge differential prices to both end users and content and application
providers.46 Conventional economics has long recognized the existence of
44. See Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 58.
45. See id. at 58–59.
46. For a more technical discussion, see Yoo, Consumers and Innovation, supra note 9, at

2010]

INNOVATIONS THAT CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO

97

“network economic effects,” which cause a network to increase in value as
the number of users connected to it increases. To use a classic example,
the value of a telephone network to a particular consumer depends on
more than just the services provided and the price charged, as is the case
with most goods. It also depends on the number of other subscribers
connected to the network. The more people you can reach through the
network, the more valuable it becomes.
The benefits created by the network economic effect for telephone
networks arise with respect to a single class of customers. When a market
is two sided, instead of bringing together a single class of similarly
situated users, networks bring together two completely different classes
of users. In those cases, the value is determined not by the number of
users of the same class, but rather the number of users of the other class.
A classic example is broadcast television, which brings together two
groups: viewers and advertisers. Advertisers gain no benefit (and if
anything suffer a detriment) from belonging to a network with a large
number of other advertisers. The value of the network for advertisers is
instead determined solely by the number of viewers, i.e., the size of the
other class of users.
The literature suggests that social welfare would be maximized if
the network provider were permitted to price discriminate on both sides
of the two-sided market. It also suggests that the prices paid by those on
each side of the market can differ widely and that in many cases, it is
economically beneficial for one side to subsidize the other side of the
market. The fact that the Internet has become increasingly dominated by
advertising revenue paid to content and application providers suggest
that it may be socially beneficial for content and application providers to
subsidize the prices paid by end users. An advertiser’s willingness to pay
for an ad on any particular website depends on the number of end users
viewing that website. Under these circumstances, the optimal solution
may be for the website owner to subsidize the total number of end users
by making payments to the network provider to help defray their costs of
connection. The costs of subsidizing more users would be more than
offset by the additional revenue generated by the fact that advertisers can
now reach more potential customers. In the case of broadband, this
would be both economically efficient and would be a boon to consumers
both in terms of providing service in more geographic areas and in
reducing the prices that consumers pay.47
These dynamics are again well illustrated by broadcast television.48
In many ways, broadcast television and the Internet are analogous. The
222–27.
47. See id. at 225–26.
48. See Yoo, Toward a Case-by-Case Approach, supra note 43, at 73–75.
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movie studios that create television programs play a similar role to
content and application providers. Television networks aggregate
programs and deliver them nationally in much the same manner as
content networks and backbone providers. Local broadcast stations
provide last-mile connectivity that is quite similar to the role played by
eyeball networks. In addition, the revenue structure is quite comparable,
in that television networks receive advertising revenue in much the same
manner as content and application providers. Furthermore, the cost
structure is somewhat similar in that connecting individual homes is
much more costly than distributing programming nationally.
For decades, the standard business arrangement has been for
television networks to subsidize the operations of local broadcast stations
by paying them to be members of their television networks. The
industry’s revenue and cost structure make such arrangements quite
logical. The cost of paying these broadcast stations to affiliate with a
network is more than offset by the increase in advertising revenue made
possible by the fact that the network is now able to reach a larger
audience. Broadcast television thus represents a prime example of when
firms operating on one side of the market find it economically beneficial
to subsidize end users on the other side of the market.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the affiliation fees that the networks
pay to broadcast stations is anything but uniform. The precise amount
varies with the relative strength of the network and the relative strength
of the broadcast station. Stronger broadcast stations receive more, while
weaker ones receive less. Equally interesting is the fact that in recent
years, the cash flow has begun to vary in its direction as well as
magnitude, with weaker stations having to pay rather than be paid to be
part of the television network. The dynamic nature of this pricing regime
benefits consumers by providing incentives for networks to invest in
better quality programming and by providing an incentive for stations to
provide better carriage.
The two-sided market analysis reveals the potential drawbacks of
preventing network providers from charging differential prices. As a
general matter, pricing flexibility makes it easier for network providers to
recover the costs of building additional bandwidth. Granting network
providers pricing flexibility with respect to content and application
providers should reduce the percentage of the network costs borne by
consumers. Conversely, preventing network providers from exercising
pricing flexibility with respect to content and application providers would
simply increase the proportion of the network costs that providers must
recover directly from end users. This simultaneously raises the prices paid
by consumers and decreases the likelihood that the capital improvements

2010]

INNOVATIONS THAT CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO

99

will ever be built.49 Charging content and application providers
differential prices thus has the potential to increase social welfare and can
reduce, not increase, the burden borne by consumers.
CONCLUSION
It is all too easy to forget that the Internet is not a monolith with a
brooding omnipresence overseeing the entire system. Instead, it is a
collection of autonomous systems that determines the terms of
interconnection through a series of arms-length negotiations between
individual networks. Given the Internet’s essence as a network of
networks, it should come as no surprise that no two packets will pay the
same amount for the same service.
The developments that I have outlined in this article have made
such differences even more likely. The network no longer adheres to the
rigid and uniform hierarchy that characterized the early Internet and its
predecessor, the NSFNET. Packets can now travel along radically
different paths based on the topology of the portion of the network
through which they travel. This is the inevitable result of reducing costs
and experimenting with new structures. At the same time that network
providers are experimenting with new topologies, they are also
experimenting with new business relationships. Gone are the days when
networks interconnected through peering and transit and imposed allyou-can eat pricing on all end users. That fairly simple and uniform set
of contractual arrangements has been replaced by a much more complex
set of business relationships that reflect creative solutions to an
increasingly complex set of economic problems. Again, these differences
mean that the service that any particular packet receives and the amount
that it pays will vary with the business relationships between the
networks through which it travels. Although many observers reflexively
view such deviations from the status quo with suspicion, in many (if not
most) cases, they represent nothing more than the natural evolution of a
network trying to respond to an ever-growing diversity of customer
demands. Imposing regulation that would thwart such developments
threaten to increase costs and discourage investment in ways that
ultimately work to the detriment of the consumers that such regulation is
ostensibly designed to protect.

49. See Wall Street’s Perspective on Telecommunications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 13–16 (2006) (testimony of Craig E.
Moffett, Vice President and Senior Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg589/pdf/CHRG-109shrg589.pdf.
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